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Abstract: In the early 1980s Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had commer-
cial banking sectors that were dominated by local banks. The largest 
countries in Latin America were subjected to common international 
economic pressures during both the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s – includ-
ing the expansion of capital markets in the periphery and integration into 
the regional trade agreements NAFTA and Mercosur – and the post-
1998 financial turmoil. By 2015, however, the three countries had con-
solidated alternative commercial banking systems: domestic private 
group dominated (Brazil), mixed (i.e., ownership more evenly divided 
among public, private domestic, and foreign banks (Argentina), and 
foreign bank dominated (Mexico). The article traces these alternative 
outcomes to the power of prereform private financial groups, the viru-
lence of “twin crises” in the transition from fixed to floating exchange 
rates, and the (contingent) role played by government ideology. 
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Introduction 
The growth and diversification of the financial sector in developing 
economies is at the center of the economic globalization that has swept 
the world since the last quarter of the twentieth century. Though the 
Great Recession has redeemed regulation and Keynesian interventionist 
tools, it is doubtful that the trend will be drastically reversed. The major 
features of financial globalization in emerging markets (i.e., the diversifi-
cation of securities and bond markets, the free flow of capital, and the 
internationalization of the banking industry) seem to be here to stay. 
Indeed, it has been widely asserted that to effectively ride the globaliza-
tion wave and attract foreign capital, governments in emerging econo-
mies have to enact reforms primarily aimed at reassuring international 
investors, such as anchoring domestic exchange rates, sanctioning central 
bank independence, and strictly adhering to the Basel requirements in 
the banking industry.1 The corollary of these reforms would be the inex-
orable weakening of domestic financial actors, in particular public and 
private commercial banks that have engaged for decades in fiscal profli-
gacy, protection, and political favors.2 
However, in the three major economies of Latin America this early 
vision of globalization interpreters is far from taking hold. Although 
foreign ownership has increased almost everywhere, after two decades of 
thorough financial internationalization, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina 
display radically different financial and banking systems. This study fo-
cuses on commercial banking, which is the former stronghold of state 
financial interventionism in these economies and the form most chal-
lenged by financial globalization. In Brazil, after decades of economic 
internationalization, private domestic financial groups are the most dy-
namic local players in terms of asset value and deposits. Indeed, the main 
Brazilian domestic group, Itaú, has internationalized to become the larg-
est commercial bank in the Southern Hemisphere in terms of market 
capitalization. In Argentina public banks, along with some new local 
private groups, are now central players in the retail sector. In Mexico, 
which had an archetypical powerful Latin American financial bourgeoisie 
in the twentieth century, commercial banking has become almost com-
pletely internationalized in the neoliberal aftermath. For instance, by 
2010 more than 80 percent of the system was in the hands of major 
                                                 
1  The Basel accords organize the regulatory framework on capital ratios and 
other issues for commercial banking worldwide.  
2  For good reviews of this literature, see Martínez-Díaz (2009) and Stallings and 
Studart (2006). 




international banks. In sum, the three largest economies of Latin Ameri-
ca have consolidated alternative commercial banking structures in the 
financial globalization era: Brazil has a domestic group-dominated struc-
ture; Argentina, a mixed structure (ownership fairly evenly divided 
among public, local private, and foreign banks); and Mexico, a foreign 
bank-dominated structure. 
This article seeks to describe and explain the different trajectories 
commercial banking systems in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina took in 
order to adapt to financial internationalization, and which resulted in 
profoundly divergent ownership and functioning structures. The mor-
phology of the commercial banking sector is relevant for two main rea-
sons. First, some evidence suggests that in developing economies subject 
to economic uncertainties solid public and private domestic banking 
institutions will be more likely to expand credit for local consumers and 
firms across the country (Haber and Musacchio 2005; Bleger 2000). For 
example, the Banco do Brasil in Brazil (a mixed public/private bank) and 
the Banco Nación in Argentina (a public bank) account for most of the 
credit that flows to the agricultural sector, especially to medium and 
small firms. Second, and more important from a political economy per-
spective, the distinct outcomes of the banking structure help shape soci-
oeconomic coalition building under neoliberalism and beyond and are 
relevant for understanding macroeconomic regimes. Many argue that the 
weight of the private banking sectors in Brazil and Mexico has been one 
of the factors behind the persistence of orthodox financial policy based 
on high interest rates since left-wing policies and ideas swept the conti-
nent. Indeed, in Brazil the political choices and alignments of the owners 
of the private domestic groups Itaú and Bradesco are a regular topic in 
the political and business press (see Bianchi and Braga 2005).  
We contend that the analysis of the origins of alternative commer-
cial banking structures should be divided into two fundamental historical 
stages. The first stage, which we call “exchange rate-based stabilization,” 
signals the period in which neoliberal governments attempted to tame 
high inflation through a nominal anchor. The second stage, which we 
call the “postliberal” or “postadjustment” period, is that where – largely 
as a result of international financial volatility and domestic pressures – 
governments free the exchange rate, often seeking an “administered 
flotation.” The commercial banking sectors in Brazil and Mexico under-
went these two stages in very different ways. In both countries the inter-
lude in exchange rate-based stabilization resulted in the strengthening of 
top domestic private financial groups in the commercial segment. In 
Argentina, by contrast, regulators sought banking internationalization as 
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a way to strengthen the financial system. The Argentine government 
limited the intervention capacities of the Central Bank of Argentina and 
pushed through prudent regulations that were even tougher than the 
international standards set by the Basel accords, effectively weakening 
domestic financial actors. In Brazil the consolidation of domestic private 
banks continued in the postadjustment period. In Mexico and Argentina, 
however, the initial trends were drastically reversed after monetary stabi-
lization and adjustment – that is, during the period of flexible exchange 
rates. In Mexico new regulatory changes enabled the massive expansion 
of the major international banks that went on to take over the main local 
private commercial banks. In Argentina, by contrast, the postliberal era 
witnessed an unlikely but extended comeback by both public and local 
private banks. 
We have identified two variables that are crucial to understanding 
these alternative trajectories: (i) prereform power of the local private 
financial elite and (ii) the virulence of “twin crises” – that is, the simulta-
neous eruption of currency (i.e., capital account) and banking crises dur-
ing the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates. Unlike in Argen-
tina and other Latin American countries, in Brazil and Mexico local pri-
vate banks were central actors under the import substitution industriali-
zation (ISI) model and gathered considerable political and economic 
strength. Thus, they were able to politically counter the systemic dena-
tionalization tendencies triggered by the initial financial opening. Argen-
tina, by contrast, engendered very weak local private financial groups 
under its inward-oriented model. These groups’ limited lobbying capacity 
vis-à-vis the technocratic neoliberal elite paved the way for sweeping 
domestic banking denationalization during the initial period of economic 
stabilization.  
However, the strong currency and banking/insolvency crises – 
which signaled the end of the fixed exchange-rate regimes, the 1995 
“tequila effect” in Mexico, and the December 2001 financial meltdown 
in Argentina – drastically changed the status quo and undermined bank-
ing “stakeholders” in both countries. Thus, the neoliberal technocracy 
led by President Zedillo in Mexico after 1995 radically altered policy and 
laid the foundations for the future denationalization of the commercial 
banking system. Conversely, the 2001–2002 crisis gave way to the emer-
gence of a center-left, populist government that adopted a more inter-
ventionist financial policy. This strategy cemented a coalition between 
private and public domestic banks. Brazil, on the other hand, never ex-
perienced comparable twin crises: therefore, traditional private banks 




managed to maintain the status quo throughout the postneoliberal peri-
od.  
The first part of the article discusses how our approach departs 
from the dominant literature on the politics of financial policy in devel-
oping economies. The second part presents the comparative-historical 
method we use. The third part presents a more detailed narrative of 
commercial bank-related financial policy and the alternative factors that 
shaped the outcome in each historical stage. 
The Political Economy of the Financial Sector in 
Latin America: From Capital Account  
Liberalization to Varieties of Financial Systems 
By the late 1980s three major issues were at stake in the area of the liber-
alization of finance in developing countries: (i) liberalization/deregula-
tion of the capital account and domestic interest rates, (ii) the implemen-
tation of central bank independence, and (iii) the opening of the domes-
tic banking system to foreign banks. Capital liberalization and interest-
rate liberalization were closely tied to the short-term goals of price and 
exchange-rate stabilization. While the timing between exchange-rate re-
form, tariff liberalization, and opening to external financial flows often 
varied (and was hotly debated by economists), financial and interest-rate 
deregulation were seen as essential preconditions to cope with inflation-
ary pressures and to reschedule debt with multilateral institutions. In the 
early literature the ability of mobile capital holders to threaten to exit and 
spark a balance of payments crisis were seen as the main triggers of capi-
tal account liberalization and exchange-rate reform – that is, the end of 
currency controls and of multiple regimes (Frieden 1991; Haggard and 
Maxfield 1996; Loireaux et al. 1997; Remmer 1998). 
In Latin America the control of the money supply and the fiscal 
profligacy of public (especially subnational) banks were considered es-
sential for the consolidation of price stability. Thus, for some scholars 
and multilateral institutions, the institutional crystallization of central 
bank independence and the opening of domestic banking sectors would 
help to stabilize sound currencies. The duration of a government’s ten-
ure and the country’s need for balance of payments support (Maxfield 
1997a) or the willingness of authoritarian elites in retreat to insulate eco-
nomic policymaking (Boylan 2001) explained the sanctioning of central 
bank independence.  
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This early scholarship on financial openings and central bank inde-
pendence in developing countries, which is generally advanced by inter-
national political economy scholars, tends to emphasize commonality – 
that is, how most countries were increasingly “forced” to lift capital 
controls and to institutionally sanction central bank independence. In 
contrast, the comparative politics camp began to call attention to the fact 
that domestic governments had more leeway to intervene with regard to 
the degree and timing of financial liberalization and, in particular, bank-
ing sector opening; moreover, considerable variation emerged in the 
politics of financial sector openings. The seminal works of Kessler 
(1998) and Perez (1997), for example, demonstrate that governments and 
domestic financial actors coalesced in order to bias the liberalization of 
the financial sector in favor of local banks in Mexico and Spain. For 
these authors, the privatization of public or government-intervened 
banks was a key tool for the crafting of domestic coalitions that could 
administer liberalization pressures. More recently, Lukauskas and Mi-
nushkin (2000), Martínez-Díaz (2009), Stallings and Studart (2006), and 
Epstein (2011) have similarly explored how the virulence of banking 
crises affect the timing and the degree of domestic financial and banking 
opening.  
This more recent comparative political economy literature is useful 
to assess the different timing and styles of financial openings. Nonethe-
less, there is no clear explanation or conceptualization of the resulting 
alternative banking systems. We do not possess a theoretical or causal 
framework that can account for these different trajectories or for the 
varieties of financial and commercial banking systems that have consoli-
dated after two decades of financial deregulation. This article is an initial 
effort to cover this theoretical and empirical gap. 
Methods: A Comparative Historical-Institutional 
Approach 
This study employs the comparative method based on the most similar 
systems design (Skocpol and Sommers 1980; Gerring 2001). Because 
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina share the a common Iberian cultural back-
ground and are the three largest economies in Latin America, we held 
general control variables constant. As emerging developing countries, 
they have been exposed to roughly the same constraints from interna-
tional financial markets since the early 1980s – though the cases vary, of 
course, with regard to the values of our explanatory variables (i.e., the 
type of initial banking actors, the severity of twin crises during the transi-




tion from fixed to floating exchange rates, and government ideology). 
These variables form the potential necessary conditions that launched 
these countries on their respective trajectories.3  
Comparative historical analysis provides two main advantages for 
our theoretical purposes. First, paying close attention to the historical 
sequence enables us to assess how analogous commercial banking actors 
in different countries undergo alternative stages of international financial 
pressures while expanding or shrinking their economic and political clout 
in the process. Therefore, we do not code the power and role played by 
the different state and economic actors at one point fixed in time; rather, 
we assess the evolution of their interaction in a classical historic-
institutionalist vein (see Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Thelen 1999). In that 
sequence, the relevance of some variables (e.g., ideology of policymak-
ers) is contingent on the prior existence of other factors (e.g., the onset 
of twin crises that fundamentally weaken stakeholders). This combina-
tion, whereby one variable only works if previously activated by some 
other factor, is more difficult to grasp in the large-N, econometric, and 
quantitative approaches that dominate the literature on banking politics 
(e.g., Rosas 2006). As Hacker and Pierson (2002) argue, business influ-
ence, in particular, is always relational and subjected to changes in the 
state and the economy, and its variation is best captured in historical 
sequence.  
Second, the comparative historical approach allows for the qualita-
tive distinction between two crucial periods that created alternative in-
ternational pressures for domestic banks: the exchange rate-based stabili-
zation stage (denoted by the implementation of varied forms of fixed 
exchange rates) and the postliberal or postadjustment moment (charac-
terized by exchange-rate flotation). As has been widely argued, increasing 
levels of commercial and financial integration has underscored the sali-
ence of exchange-rate policy in the developing world, which in practice 
has become increasingly tied to monetary policy. Wise (2001) and Cor-
den (2001) have posited that the transition from fixed exchange rates 
(based on a nominal anchor essentially oriented to tame inflation) to 
flexible or flotation regimes (based on the “real policy goals” approach) 
represents a defining moment in the consolidation of market reforms in 
Latin America. In general, after nominal anchors have succeeded in re-
straining fiscal and monetary policy, there is increased pressure for a 
more flexible exchange-rate regime, particularly in contexts of capital 
                                                 
3  The identification of potential necessary conditions as a minimum claim in 
causal assessments based on the most similar cases design is analyzed in 
Gerring (2001: 211). 
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flow volatility. Indeed, the recovery of fiscal and monetary policy implicit 
in the (generally controlled) floating exchange-rate regimes gives policy-
makers greater freedom to accommodate economic interests and to 
adapt to sudden changes in international financial flows. In short, the 
transition to flexible exchanges rates by “successful” market-reforming 
states became both a normative goal and a political and policy imperative 
that could hardly be avoided (see, for example, Edwards and Naim 
1997). Fixed and flexible exchange-rate regimes define two main periods 
of liberalization in macroeconomic terms. Both implied different oppor-
tunities and constraints in the relation between policymakers. The often-
traumatic transition between these regimes is a key moment for the 
structure of the financial system.  
Financial Internationalization and Commercial 
Banking: Alternative Trajectories in Brazil,  
Mexico, and Argentina 
With the consolidation of neoliberalism under the presidencies of Salinas 
(1988–1994, Mexico), Menem (1989–1999, Argentina), and Franco and 
Cardoso (1992–1995 and 1995–2003, Brazil), each country established or 
consolidated a nominal anchor to control historically high levels of infla-
tion. Whereas Argentina installed a currency board – which mandated 
that every peso should be backed by a dollar reserve and in practice im-
plied that capital inflows and outflows would set the monetary base – 
Mexico and Brazil instituted more traditional fixed exchange-rate sys-
tems.4 These economic schemes drastically hampered the capacity of 
central banks to finance the federal government and subnational states; 
in these three cases, however, the administrations resorted to noninfla-
tionary borrowing in capital markets.  
However, despite similar stabilization approaches, the impact of ne-
oliberalism in the banking sector varied remarkably. Table 1 shows the 
trends in domestic banking internationalization in Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico measured as market share by type of bank in the period of ex-
change rate-based stabilization. In the three cases de jure or de facto 
central bank independence from elected authorities was sanctioned. 
Likewise, the capacity of central banks to act as financial regulators was 
notably strengthened. However, in Argentina the period of initial ad-
                                                 
4  For a comparison of the three countries as embodying similar strategies of 
fixed or quasi-fixed exchange-rate regimes in this period, see Frenkel and Ra-
petti (2010: 19–20). 




justment and exchange-rate stabilization resulted in the massive expan-
sion of international banks. The established financial bourgeoisie and the 
public banks were clear losers under neoliberalism. The whole local pri-
vate sector lost a remarkable 66 percent of its market share; even the 
largest private banks were severely weakened. Public banks also shrank 
by about 20 percent. It is worth noting that during this period the system 
witnessed a fivefold increase in deposits as a result of economic stability 
and growth (data in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000).  
Table 1.  Market Share in Deposits/Assets by Type of Institution (% of the 
Total), Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization Period 
Country Type of Bank Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization 
Argentina  1991 2001 % Change 
 Public 42.5 32.8 -22.8 
 Private Domestic + CU 43.2 15.0 -65.2 
 Top 3 Private Domestic 11.9 7.2 -39.4 
 Foreign 14.3 51.8 262.2 
Brazil   1993 1999 % Change 
 Public 55.6 50.9 -8.6 
 Private Domestic + CU 38.9 32.6 -16.2 
 Top 3 Private Domestic 17.4 22.7 30.2 
 Foreign 4.8 16.8 247.8 
Mexico   1988 1995 % Change 
 Public 99.0 0.0  - 
 Private Domestic  0.0 95.0  - 
 Top 3 Private Domestic 0.0 50  - 
 Foreign 1.0 5.0  - 
Note:  For reasons of data availability, deposits are used for Argentina and Brazil, 
whereas assets are used for Mexico (both measures tend to overlap). The da-
ta on Mexico is complemented by Haber (2005), Martínez-Díaz (2009), and 
Hernández-Murillo (2007). “Private Domestic” in Argentina and Brazil includes 
credit unions (CU). 
Source:  Central Banks of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
In Brazil and Mexico the financial sector also deepened during stabiliza-
tion. Yet, the power of both state and private domestic banking actors to 
resist the strains of neoliberalism was much stronger. In Brazil state 
banks lost about 8 percent of their market share.5 The entire local private 
banking sector, which had approximately the same market share as its 
Argentine counterpart previous to the reform, only lost 16 percent. 
However, the top echelons of the established financial bourgeoisie in-
                                                 
5  It is worth stressing that we are analyzing commercial banking. Therefore, state 
development banks that do not take deposits, such as the Brazilian Develop-
ment Bank (BNDES) in Brazil, are excluded. 
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creased their market power by 30 percent. Finally, while foreign banks 
also made significant inroads, their overall share remained quite limited. 
In Mexico, the expansion of local private banks during the initial stage of 
neoliberalism was more spectacular and was largely a consequence of the 
privatization strategy of the government. The commercial banking sector 
was formally nationalized in 1982. As we shall see, massive state disin-
vestment in 1991–1992 privileged domestic financial groups. This recon-
figuration of the banking system from scratch in Mexico makes the cal-
culated percentage change in market share during the period less useful. 
Yet, table 1 shows that during the initial stage of neoliberalism, the Mex-
ican financial elite emerged as the strongest private actor by far among 
the three countries: in Mexico the three largest local private banks had 50 
percent of the market share; in Brazil, 22.7 percent; and in Argentina, 
just 7.2.  
Table 2.  Market Share in Deposits/Assets by Type of Institution (% of the 
Total), Postadjustment Period (Exchange-Rate Flotation) 
Country Type of Bank Postadjustment Period 
Argentina   2001 2013 % Change 
  Public 32.8 46.5 42 
 Private Domestic  15.0 27.3 82 
  Top 3 Private Domestic 10.4 15.7 51 
  Foreign 51.8 26.2 -49 
Brazil   1999 2013 % Change 
  Public 50.9 40.4 -21 
 Private Domestic  32.6 46.3 42 
  Top 3 Private Domestic 22.7 29.3 29 
  Foreign 16.8 13.3 -21 
Mexico   1995 2013 % Change 
  Public - -  - 
 Private Domestic  95.0 29.5 -69 
  Top 3 Private Domestic 50.0 17.7 -65 
  Foreign 5.0 70.5  1,311 
 
The poststabilization period (table 2) witnessed more similar trends in 
Argentina and Brazil, as domestic financial actors gained market share in 
both cases. In Argentina denationalization was largely reverted. After the 
2001 crisis and under the Duhalde, Néstor Kirchner, and Cristina Fer-
nández de Kirchner governments public banks recovered and local pri-
vate banks doubled their share – though within a downsized banking 
system. At the same time, international banks shrank by 50 percent dur-
ing the postadjustment period. Brazil witnessed more continuity in the 
postliberal period under President Lula, with the local private sector 




continuing to thrive and increasing its market share to 46 percent. For-
eign banks only essentially preserved the market obtained in the early 
stages of neoliberalism. The contrast with Mexico is remarkable, where 
local banks were decimated after 1995. A series of regulatory changes 
paved the way for major foreign banks to make massive inroads in the 
country and take over the recently reprivatized banks. The public com-
mercial banking sector, historically weak in Mexico, remained nonexist-
ent. 
In sum, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the trajectory of financial reform taken by these countries resulted in 
three distinct commercial banking systems: a domestic group-dominated 
system in Brazil, a mixed system (in which ownership is more evenly 
divided among public, private domestic, and foreign banks) in Argentina, 
and a foreign bank-dominated system in Mexico. 
Explaining the Outcomes 
What explains these different trajectories? Why were local financial ac-
tors, who were decimated under neoliberalism, able to recover in Argen-
tina during the postadjustment period? Why was the domestic financial 
bourgeoisie able to thrive in Brazil under neoliberalism and beyond de-
spite the expected inroads made by foreign banks? Finally, why did Mex-
ico, with its archetypical powerful Latin American financial bourgeoisie 
in the twentieth century, witness the almost complete denationalization 
of its banking sector? 
Figure 1 sketches both the historical periods and the main variables 
that produced the outcome of a certain banking structure. We argue that 
the key factor that explains the level of bank internationalization during 
the initial stabilization period is the power that domestic private financial 
elites generated under the inward-oriented model – that is, during the 
preneoliberal period. As we show below, Mexico and Brazil developed 
strong domestic financial private sectors during import substitution in-
dustrialization (ISI). In Brazil the source of this strength primarily 
stemmed from inflation revenues; in Mexico, from the financial elite 
intermediation with industry. In both countries, however, the domestic 
financial elite used their political connections and economic power to 
bias liberalization and financial asset privatization in their favor and con-
solidate their market power. In Argentina, by contrast, for reasons that 
we explain below, a domestic financial elite never took hold under the 
inward-oriented model. Thus, it was easy for neoliberal policymakers 
during the Menem presidency (1989–1999) to impose liberalization on 
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weak actors that were already in retreat and to allow massive internation-
alization.  
Figure 1. Period Exchange Rate–Based Stabilization Transition Floating 
Exchange Rate 
 
Yet, in the cases where the momentous transition from fixed to floating 
exchange rates resulted in severe twin crises (currency and banking cri-
ses), which shook the banking status quo, the emerging governments had 
more leeway to recraft the domestic banking sectors, which were in des-
perate need of help and funds. In Mexico the orthodox neoliberal wing 
of the PRI, led by Zedillo (1995–2000), consistently favored international 
banking after the “tequila crisis” and the peso devaluation in 1994. The 
populist, center-left governments of Duhalde and the Kirchners (2002–
2011) in Argentina, by contrast, privileged domestic public and private 
banks in the reconstruction of finance after the unprecedented 2001 
crisis. Meanwhile, in Brazil the transition from a fixed to a floating ex-
change rate in 1999–2000 was relatively smooth. Thus the (federal) state 
and especially the private banks that managed to weather the storm of 
liberalization achieved dominance, though the market became more 
competitive. In this case, however, the ideology of the postliberal gov-
ernment is less relevant because the structural power of the top local 
private banks was unaffected by the crisis; instead, they maintained the 
status quo of the initial neoliberal period. 
In short, these dramatic shifts in the retail banking sector, both be-
tween ISI and the neoliberal period and during the postadjustment stage 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, cannot be explained solely 
in terms of commercial strategies vis-à-vis consumers and firms. Politics, 
coalitions, and the alternative impact of currency and banking crises also 




mattered. The next section describes in more detail the (de)nationaliza-
tion trends and the role played by the factors just discussed. 
The Period of Exchange Rate-Based  
Stabilization 
Brazil: The Power of Domestic Financial Groups  
In Brazil stabilization and the liberalization of the current account in the 
early 1990s brought about unprecedented challenges to the banking 
sector. As in most neoliberal experiences, the government strengthened 
the regulatory powers of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), forged ahead 
with a deposit insurance system, and complied with the Basel criteria for 
capital requirements. However, with the introduction of the Real Plan in 
1994, Cardoso also implemented the Temporary Special Administration 
Regime (RAET), which empowered authorities to liquidate, recapitalize, 
or restructure and sell banks under stress. Between 1994 and 1997 the 
BCB went on to control about 17 percent of the banking system (40 
financial institutions out of 242) – which included both public (federal 
and state) and private commercial banks (Stallings and Studart 2006: 
226).  
RAET was complemented by a series of BCB programs designed to 
execute the final reconversion of the different bank types into new enti-
ties. The Program of Incentives for the Restructuring and Strengthening 
of the Financial System (PROER) was introduced by decree in 1995 for 
private banks. It offered tax incentives and credit facilities for acquiring 
banks. The Program of Incentives to the Reduction of State Public Sec-
tor in Banking Activity (PROES) and the Program for the Strengthening 
of the Federal Financial Institutions (PROEF) – both launched in 1997 – 
established similar programs for state banks and national public banks, 
respectively. Of course, the main political battle was waged between the 
federal government and regional states, which owned faltering banks. 
State (i.e., provincial) banks had traditionally jeopardized the centralized 
management of monetary policy in Brazil and had provided governors 
with sources of uncontrolled spending. In 1995, in the midst of financial 
turbulence, RAET put the two major state banks – the bank of Sao Pau-
lo (Banespa) and the Bank of Rio de Janeiro (Banerj) – under federal 
control (see Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill 2005). 
The administration initially privileged the largest local financial con-
glomerates in the privatization of state banks and intervened banks. 
Banerj and, later, the Bank of Minas Gerais and the Bank of Goias were 
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awarded to the domestic group Itaú. Unibanco was granted the govern-
ment-revamped Banco Nacional through the facilities offered by PRO-
ER. Bradesco, the third major local bank, acquired the Bank of Bahía 
and Credireal, a state bank in Mina Gerais.6 It is worth noting that most 
of these privatized banks retained all the functions as employee paymas-
ters and managers of provincial state administration accounts. Thus, the 
three main local private banks consolidated their market positions 
through auctions in which foreign banks were largely banned from par-
ticipating. The government did, however, turn to foreign capital if local 
corporations could not afford or were reluctant to take over banking 
facilities (Rodrigues de Paula 2003). This approach enabled the admin-
istration to achieve its twofold goal of obtaining higher sale revenues and 
injecting competition.  
In sum, although the major Brazilian banks did not develop exten-
sive ties with industry during ISI as did their Mexican counterparts, they 
were undoubtedly powerful players who had fared well under ISI. Infla-
tion provided easy revenues as banks paid low or negative interest rates 
on the excess of demand deposits over reserve requirements. It also 
reduced the real value of liabilities and added liquidity, which made it 
easier for borrowers to repay loans (Baer and Nazmi 2000: 6).7 Brazilian 
banks also profited from the opportunities in secondary markets, which 
had been opened by the reform initiated by the military regime (1964–
1985). Therefore, their power was fueled by two essential revenue 
sources under ISI. The first source was so-called treasury operations, 
which consisted of trading government bonds subject to indexation. The 
second source was the menu of basic services through which domestic 
banks granted cash-starved consumers rapid access to their accounts.8 
Thus, despite macroeconomic instability, the private banking sector 
boomed in Brazil during the 1980s and early 1990s. Unlike in Argentina, 
the semiclosed economy in Brazil engendered massive private financial 
actors under ISI – especially Itaú, Bradeso, and Unibanco – who had 
                                                 
6  The privatization of Banerj offers a good example of the coalition between the 
government and domestic financial groups. The government hired the domes-
tic investment bank Bozzano to organize the sale, which finally awarded the 
bank to the domestic group Itaú in a bidding process in which no foreign bank 
could participate (Baer and Nazmi 2000: 15).  
7  On the massive growth of Brazilian banks in the inflation period, see also 
Carvalho 1998 and 2000.  
8  Indeed, unlike in other developing economies, currency substitution was never 
relevant in Brazil. Thus widespread indexation and payments system innovation 
induced the general public to maintain their funds in the domestic banking sys-
tem (see Carvalho 1998: 304 and Baer and Nazmi 2000: 8). 




developed the economic power and know-how to profit from controlled 
financial liberalization. 
Mexico: The Traditional Lobbying Power of the  
Financial-Industrial Conglomerates 
The commercial banking sector in Mexico was nationalized in 1982 by 
the Lopez Portillo administration in an attempt to halt capital flight in 
the wake of the debt crisis. Yet the clash with the private sector did not 
last. The De la Madrid administration (1982–1988) focused on taming 
inflation by introducing major monetary and fiscal reforms. President 
Salinas (1988–1994) pressed ahead with further financial and market 
liberalization and dismantled the structures of financial repression by 
freeing up interest rates and lifting credit controls and reserve require-
ments on private banks. This move increased the amount of credit avail-
able to the private sector and sought to diversify financial instruments by 
allowing banks to issue short-term letters of credit and permitting the 
formation of nonbank financial holding companies (Maxfield 1997b: 11–
12). Investment in commercial paper enabled banks to enter an already 
burgeoning market dominated by the stock brokerage houses, which had 
grown after the 1982 liberalizing reforms. 
Despite widespread liberalization, bank reprivatization and integra-
tion into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were 
carried out in a way that accommodated and benefited the interests of 
the established financial-industrial elite. The privatization legislation 
passed in 1990 did not allow foreign banks to participate in the bank 
auctions and did not permit international financial enterprises to partici-
pate in financial intermediation in national markets – though the latter 
could perform banking functions with nonresidents. Moreover, the legis-
lation also encouraged the formation of local financial holding compa-
nies. As Haber (2005: 2329) notes, by not breaking up the concentrated 
structure in which four banks controlled 70 percent of total bank assets, 
the Mexican government signaled to bidders that they would not have to 
act in a competitive environment. In order to prop up prices, accounting 
standards were not modified – for example, when a loan was past due, 
only interest in arrears was counted as not performing, and the loan 
could be rolled over. In sum, concentration, a lack of competition, and 
weak accounting standards turned banks into an attractive prize.  
The traditional Mexican economic groups, whose ties with the fi-
nancial sector had been sundered by the 1982 expropriation, were im-
portant beneficiaries of bank reprivatization. For example, Bancomer 
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and Serfin – two of the largest three banks in terms of asset value – came 
to be controlled by the traditional economic groups Visa and Vitro, re-
spectively. Banamex, the largest bank, was purchased by relatively new 
financial players that owned stock brokerage houses. Protection of 
course continued in the wake of the NAFTA negotiations, during which 
the recently empowered bankers engaged in intense lobbying.9  
The main factor that explains this state alliance with domestic eco-
nomic groups in the reprivatization of banks was the traditional power 
of the financial bourgeoisie. Like in Brazil, in Mexico a private-financial 
elite was able to consolidate itself as a key player under the inward-
oriented model. Indeed, in Mexico the state never made real inroads into 
the commercial banking sector and mostly operated in investment bank-
ing through Nacional Financiera (Nafinsa). Unlike in Brazil, however, 
this banking elite was linked with the main domestic economic groups 
through a complex web of cross shareholding and interlocking directo-
ries.10 Thus, Mexican private banks profited from their primary role as 
financiers (and owners) of the main industrial conglomerates in an envi-
ronment of tighter monetary policy and stronger currency.11 Moreover, 
the influence of Mexico’s banking elite (which, we should stress, was 
financial as well as industrial) did not cease after the nationalization of 
banks in 1982. As Maxfield (1997b: 106–107) contends, the neoliberal 
government hastened to counter the effects of nationalization on the 
private sector by relinquishing the control of nonbank stocks, preserving 
the independence of bank management, and encouraging the conglom-
eration of nonbank financial enterprises in a burgeoning liberalized mar-
ket for portfolio investments. Thereafter, Salinas’s banking policy essen-
tially served as a coalitional fulcrum for his alliance with the main eco-
nomic conglomerates that had dominated the Mexican private sector and 
had mostly gone unharmed during the events of 1982.12 Some traditional 
                                                 
9  In words of Kessler (1998: 48), “The same Mexican negotiators who conceded 
significant trade and services concessions in NAFTA fought tenaciously to with 
the US to guarantee that Mexican banks retained strong protection against for-
eign competition.” See also Maxfield 1997b. 
10  Camp (1989: 173–190) well describes this financial-industrial elite based on 
interlocking directorates and argues that Mexican private bankers “have exerted 
an unusually significant influence over Mexican government policy” (Camp 
1989: 175).  
11  For a comparison of the Brazilian and Mexican preneoliberal financial elites in 
this vein, see the excellent study by Maxfield 1991. 
12  Some new local financial players in the secondary markets, the bolseros, also had 
a prominent role in the bank reprivatization of 1991–92 (see Minushkin 2002). 




families and groups changed roles and banks, but the main point is that 
the initial phase of financial liberalization consolidated a traditional pri-
vate oligopoly. As Kessler (1998: 49) argues, the protection of local 
banks under Salinas was geared “to cement the PRI’s partnership and 
alliance with Mexico’s wealthiest and more powerful capitalists.” 
Argentina: The Weakness of Domestic Financial Capital 
The Argentine economy went through significant transformations during 
the 1990s, which radically reconfigured both state–market relations and 
domestic business groups. After taming high inflation and balancing the 
budget, the government implemented a broad financial reform. In 1991 
the economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, launched the Convertibility 
Plan, which tied the peso to the dollar and limited the monetary base to 
the level of international reserves in hard currency; this turned the Cen-
tral Bank of Argentina (BCRA) into a de facto currency board. The ad-
ministration enacted a new BCRA charter and introduced innovative 
prudential regulations.  
Moreover, the devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 
triggered a confidence crisis in Argentina that deepened the massive 
restructuring of its banking sector. The run hit wholesale banks in par-
ticular, as well as provincial, cooperative, and small retail banks. Several 
policies were launched to pave the way for the expansion of international 
banks. A privately owned deposit insurance company (Seguro de Depó-
sitos S.A., SEDESA) and two trust funds (Fondo Fiduciario para la 
Capitalización Bancaria and Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarrollo Provin-
cial) were established with the purpose of financing the merger and ac-
quisition of small and medium-sized banks.  
Stringent banking regulations and supervisory mechanisms were 
implemented in line with the Basel recommendations. The BCRA estab-
lished high minimum-capital requirements in a horizontal manner. Pri-
vate-monitoring norms and a formally noninterventionist policy that left 
troubled banks subject to market forces biased the prudential system in 
favor of the largest international financial conglomerates (Wierzba and 
Golla 2005). As expected, the outcome of the process was further for-
eignization and greater concentration of the financial system – a trend 
intensified by the tight monetary regime’s squeeze on liquidity (Bleger 
2000). The authorities reacted to these events by strengthening their 
commitment to convertibility institutions, thus increasing exit costs. 
                                                                                                    
But, according to Minushkin and Parker (2002: 217), “The essential nature of 
the relationship between the financial sector and the government survived.”  
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Restrictions to liquidity fueled the dollarization of contracts. In 1994 53 
percent of deposits were denominated in US dollars; in 2001, 68 percent. 
Dollarization ratios were even higher for loans and fueled the profitabil-
ity of international banks, which faced no (apparent) exchange-rate risk. 
Significantly, in contrast to prudential regulations that accounted for 
multiple types of risk, no policies were passed to keep banks safe from 
an eventual devaluation.  
In short, foreign entry was explicitly encouraged through a series of 
incentives and a very permissive legal framework. Foreign banks sought 
to exploit the advantages of the installed retail network. The extent of 
the local banking sector’s retrenchment was impressive. By 2000, only 
one large private domestic bank, Galicia, remained open as a locally 
owned private entity. Out of around 38 cooperative banks, 2 remained in 
2001. Unlike in Brazil, state (provincial) bank privatization was not used 
to strengthen major local commercial private banks strained by sectoral 
liberalization (Clarke and Cull 2001).  
The main difference between Mexico and Brazil at this stabilization 
stage was the traditional weakness of the domestic financial elite. Unlike 
in the industrial realm, in which massive domestic economic groups 
flourished, in Argentina large financial groups never consolidated during 
ISI. The origins of the Argentine financial elite’s “weakness” (Thorburn 
2004: 165, 206) under the inward-oriented model were twofold. First, the 
early integration of Argentina into world markets during the agrarian 
boom of the early twentieth century paved the way for the arrival of 
foreign banks in a way unmatched in Brazil and Mexico. Second, the 
extremely unstable macroeconomic environment during the postwar 
period favored booming banks, which eventually collapsed in expensive 
failures. Unlike in Brazil during that period, where three “majors” domi-
nated local commercial banking under ISI, in Argentina the weakness of 
local actors was reflected in the volatile bank rankings. Tellingly, the two 
major private banks in the early 1980s were liquidated and their owners 
imprisoned (Quintela 2005). In Brazil domestic private banks profited 
from and thrived under high but controlled inflation. In Argentina, by 
contrast, extreme macroeconomic instability (including three episodes of 
near hyperinflation in 1975, 1989, and 1990) and the absence of vibrant 
secondary financial markets precluded the consolidation (even the sur-
vival) of any major domestic financial group. Weakly integrated local 
financial conglomerates with tenuous links to the much larger industry-
based economic groups were easily displaced during the neoliberal peri-
od; they were simply not at the policy discussion table. Moreover, the 
importance of cooperative banks and credit unions in the semiclosed 




economy (which accounted for 15 percent of the private sector in 1991 
and was much less prepared to cope with international competition) 
signaled the prereform internal heterogeneity and atomization of the 
private financial sector in Argentina. 
The Transition from Fixed to Flexible Exchange 
Rates: The Role of Twin Crises and the  
Postliberal Structure of Banking in Mexico,  
Argentina, and Brazil 
In the economics literature almost every transition out of a fixed ex-
change-rate regime is classified as a currency crisis (Kaminsky and Rein-
hart 1999; Laeven and Valencia 2008). Here we define twin crises as the 
simultaneous occurrence of a currency crisis (i.e., massive capital flight 
that triggers devaluation) and a financial/banking crisis (i.e., an extended 
degree of insolvency in the banking sector). In table 3 we try to give a 
sense of the severity of both of these episodes during the transition from 
fixed to flexible exchange rates in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.  
Table 3.  Twin Crises: Banking and Currency Crises in the Transition from 
Fixed to Floating Exchange Rates 




















2001 Strong 20.1 -11 
January 
2002 274 42.1 
Mexico 
1994 Strong 18.9 -6 
December 
1994 124 74.5 
Brazil 
1999 Mild 8.7 0.3 
January 
1999 67 15.1 
Note:  “NPL” refers to the peak of nonperforming loans as % of total loans in the 
banking system. Depreciation is calculated as the maximum percentage differ-
ence within the year after leaving the fixed exchange-rate regime. International 
reserve loss is calculated as the percentage drop previous to leaving the fixed 
exchange rate. 
Source:  Laeven and Valencia (2008), IMF, and World Bank. 
In Mexico political and economic instability throughout 1994 triggered a 
massive run on peso-denominated assets. The government was forced to 
devalue the peso by 15 percent in December. Moreover, to slow capital 
outflows, the administration raised interest rates to 80 percent in the first 
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quarter of 1995.13 Government debts and bank debts soared; according 
to one estimation, foreign currency liabilities of banks increased by 47 
percent just in a few days (Martínez-Díaz 2009: 54). Overall, real depre-
ciation reached 124 percent within a year, GDP fell by around 6 percent, 
and international reserves dwindled by 74 percent (table 3). 
The financial institutions most affected were two of the largest and 
recently privatized banks, Serfin and Banamex. In view of the crisis, the 
new Zedillo government implemented the Banking Fund for the Protec-
tion of Savings (FOBAPROA), which enabled banks to clean their bal-
ance sheets by swapping nonperforming loans for a 10-year FOBA 
PROA coupon at relatively low interest rates (Haber 2005: 2342–2343). 
This massive bailout gave the government enormous leverage to reshape 
the banking industry. Zedillo belonged to the most neoliberal wing of 
the PRI. Indeed, when deregulation was initiated during the early 1990s, 
as minister of planning and budget, he opposed protection for domestic 
banks (Martínez-Díaz 2009: 57). As president, Zedillo announced that 
the fundamental recapitalization of the banking system could only come 
from foreign retail institutions. The first package of legislation passed in 
1995 increased the noncontrolling type of shares available to foreigners 
and lifted ownership limits for international banks. In 1997 the Revolu-
tionary Institutional Party (PRI) lost control of Congress in the mid-term 
elections, which cleared the way for a coalition between the neoliberal 
faction of the PRI and the right-wing Autonomous National Party 
(PAN). What followed was a series of reforms that lifted any ceiling to 
foreign entry and removed the old 20 percent limit on individual equity 
ownership. The domestic financial bourgeoisie was powerless to counter 
these reforms. The first policy package was not openly opposed by the 
“big three” (Banamex, Bancomer, and Serfin), which dominated the local 
banking association, because the foreign capital limits still protected 
them. By 1997, however, Serfin was experiencing increasing problems 
and was taken over by the government and put under the FOBAPROA 
program. The rest of the top local banks were also full of toxic assets 
and undercapitalized, which was conveniently masked by regulators’ 
accounting standards (Haber 2005). Given these banks precarious situa-
tions and the new liberal regulations, a cascade of foreign takeovers en-
sued. In the largest FDI transaction in Mexican history, Citigroup paid 
USD 12.5 billion for Banamex in May 2001.14  
                                                 
13  The bibliography on the peso crisis in Mexico is of course vast. For an over-
view, see Edwards and Naim (1997). 
14  For details of these foreign takeovers, see Thorburn 2004 and Martínez-Díaz 
2009. 




Once the established banking system had been shaken by the crisis, 
Zedillo had ample room to push forward his neoliberal view. Significant-
ly, in 2000 Banamex, the largest local bank, tried to bid for Bancomer – a 
merger that would have brought about a financial “national champion,” 
much in the way Brazil and Spain had empowered domestic financial 
groups during the liberalization of their banking sectors. However, Zedil-
lo regulators blocked the acquisition, citing the “perils of concentration,” 
and eased the way for Spain’s BBVA to complete the takeover of Ban-
comer (see Minushkin and Parker 2002). Meanwhile, the other Spanish 
major bank, Santander, acquired the Serfin Group. The argument is not 
that Mexico could have endlessly protected its banks in the context of 
NAFTA, but rather that the twin crises and Zedillo’s neoliberal technoc-
racy prevented the creation of strong national financial groups that could 
have survived and even profited from the newly liberalized order, as they 
did in Brazil. 
Although the 2001–2002 Argentine crisis was certainly not an en-
dogenous banking crisis, major socioeconomic turmoil erupted when 
Cavallo, the economy minister, announced – on the eve of a major bank 
run – the (partial) suspension of the convertibility of banking deposits (el 
corralito). Capital movements abroad were also severely restricted. Presi-
dent De la Rúa could not resist the social uprising that ensued and re-
signed. Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt, and Eduardo Duhalde 
was appointed by Congress as the provisional president and inaugurated 
his administration by formally devaluating the peso. He was succeeded in 
2003 by the democratically elected Nestor Kirchner. The consequences 
of the 2001–2002 crisis were devastating for the economy and the finan-
cial sector: GDP dropped 11 percent, international reserves dropped 40 
percent, the peso depreciated almost 300 percent within a year, and the 
amount of nonperforming loans totaled a fifth of the system (table 3).  
As in Mexico, though with different consequences, this major crisis 
had a destabilizing impact over the status quo in the commercial banking 
services. In contrast to the neoliberal 1990s strategy, an interventionist 
approach became the rule and was used to avoid bank failures. Financial 
restrictions on the public were intensified by the reprogramming of all 
the term deposits and even of some demand deposits denominated in 
US dollars (el corralón). The BCA charter was amended to give the mone-
tary authorities wider possibilities of granting assistance through the 
discount window. The government mandated that every peso discounted 
to a foreign-owned bank had to be matched by a peso from the bank’s 
“First World”-based mother companies (Yeyati and Valenzuela 2007). 
However, the banks’ headquarters were reluctant to back their subsidiar-
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ies with fresh capital. The government’s support for established local 
banks contrasted with the risk-averse nature of managers accountable to 
foreign stockholders. Indeed, the postliberal period in Argentina wit-
nessed the growth of a group of domestically owned private banks. Most 
of these new local commercial banks came from the wholesale segment. 
They had profited from the privatization of provincial and municipal 
banks and forged important political connections. In the aftermath of 
the 2002 crisis they acquired a group of foreign banks willing to leave the 
country (García 2006), although top foreign institutions remained. The 
publicly owned Banco Nación, the largest bank in the system, temporari-
ly administered the fleeing institutions. It capitalized and cleaned the 
balance sheets of troubled banks before carrying out reprivatizations that 
favored a group of local bankers.  
The local Macro Group is a paradigmatic case of the comeback of 
private banks. It jumped from a marginal position to being the 22nd 
largest bank (measured by deposits) in 2001 and the 6th largest bank in 
2009. By 2010, it was also ranked as the second largest bank in terms of 
territorial reach – second only to the state-run Banco Nación. Comafi, 
Patagonia, and the Petersen Group banks (Bancos San Juan, Santa Cruz, 
Santa Fe, and Entre Ríos) are other medium-sized, fast growing banks 
that followed a similar trajectory. Indeed, the poststabilization period in 
Argentina also witnessed the organizational resurgence of the private 
domestic banks. The Association of Argentine Banks (ADEBA) was 
relaunched by Jorge Brito, the main shareholder of the Macro Group. 
The new association stayed close to the Kirchner administrations until 
2011, supporting most of their financial policies. Of course, the benefits 
of this new financial interventionism to local actors were possible in a 
context of a more expansive economic and monetary policy. The suc-
cessful renegotiation of the sovereign debt and the resumption of eco-
nomic growth and exports under the Kirchner presidencies provided 
government with extra leverage over international financial players. In 
November 2008 the individual capitalization pension regime (created in 
1994) was nationalized, which resulted in the transfer of considerable 
financial assets to state management. Many of them were liquid deposits 
placed in the domestic banking system, which were partially redirected 
toward public banks, enhancing their participation in the market.  
In Brazil the crisis that triggered the end of the fixed exchange rate 
was much less virulent by almost any measure than in the region’s other 
major economies. The rate of nonperforming loans, currency devalua-
tion, and the decrease in international reserves was less than half that in 
Argentina and Mexico, and there was no fall in GDP (table 3). Though 




the local financial system was subjected to severe strains during the 1999 
devaluation and again during Lula’s run-up to the presidency in 2003, 
there was no major economic or social dislocation. Furthermore, the 
milder crisis in the transition to a flexible exchange rate did not affect the 
major banks but rather heavily favored the status quo. Thus, the domi-
nant players of the neoliberal period – namely, the local private banks – 
were able to expand and takeover those institutions that could not afford 
international competition and those international banks that left the 
Brazilian markets in view of their regional and global strategies. Itaú and 
Unibanco (which merged in 2008) and Bradesco bought a number of 
smaller banks and became prominent regional actors in the financial 
sector. Moreover, the privatization of (provincial) state banks, which was 
financed by the central government and favored major local banks, con-
tinued after 1999 with, for example, Itaú purchasing the Bank of Parana 
(Banestado) and the Bank of Goias. 
Alternative Explanations: International Trade 
Agreements and Bailouts  
Interestingly, factors such as international trade agreements and the ex-
istence of massive foreign bailouts cannot explain the above-analyzed 
trends in commercial banking services. First, the resulting type of com-
mercial banking structure was unaffected by the consolidation of alterna-
tive international trade agreements in Mexico (NAFTA) and in Brazil 
and Argentina (Mercosur). The initial NAFTA accords witnessed the 
paradoxical consolidation and protection of local industrial groups and 
their associated banks, as shown above. Indeed, besides the Citibank, the 
major banks that later took over most of the Mexican system were Span-
ish (BBVA and Santander) and not from the NAFTA area. This massive 
Spanish inroad signals the relative influence of the United States and 
NAFTA in Mexican banking policy. Meanwhile, the two Mercosur coun-
tries underwent diverging trends during the initial neoliberal period dur-
ing the 1990s: liberal deregulation favored foreign banks in Argentina, 
whereas protection strengthened local banks in Brazil.  
Second, the occurrence of financial bailouts also fails to explain the 
final banking structure. Although President Zedillo used the massive 
international bailout backed by the IMF and the United States after 1995 
to strengthen the government’s financial resources, “clean” the banking 
system under FOBAPROA, and advance a policy of internationalization, 
he could have used the bailout resources to strengthen domestic banking 
groups and promote financial national champions, as Brazil and Spain 
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did under neoliberalism. This possibility, as noted before, was deliberate-
ly ruled out by the Zedillo government. The fall of local banking groups 
during the peso crisis was, so we argue, the precondition for their loss of 
political and economic clout and their ultimate demise. Similarly, the 
absence of an external bailout did not deter the Kirchners’ ideological 
convictions regarding the role of international capital. Once the domi-
nance of foreign banks was undermined by the crisis, Néstor Kirchner’s 
left-wing populist government used state power and the liquidity that 
resulted from monetary policy expansion to reshape the banking system 
on more nationalist grounds.  
In sum, once in power after the twin crises, Zedillo and the Kirch-
ners had access to new resources stemming from alternative sources: a 
massive international bailout (Mexico) and a recovered and expansive 
monetary policy in the context of increasing export revenues (Argentina), 
respectively. Both profited from a strong crisis that broke the financial 
status quo, which allowed them to pursue their (contrasting) ideological 
approaches during the reconstruction of the commercial banking sector.  
Conclusions 
The notion that financial internationalization leads to the fundamental 
weakening of domestic financial actors in emerging markets has proved 
to be wrong. In some cases, such as Mexico, international banks have 
effectively come to control most of the local financial commercial sector. 
In other cases, such as Argentina and Brazil, domestic banks control 
over 70 percent of the local commercial banking system. Only Brazil, 
however, has generated strong domestic financial groups that have deep-
ened the local financial sector and are able to compete successfully in 
regional markets.  
After initially concentrating primarily on the determinants of capital 
account opening, comparative political economy went on to study alter-
native “styles” and the timing of financial openings in emerging markets 
subjected to neoliberal restructuring. However, this literature has not 
produced an explanatory framework that can account for the different 
trajectories taken by financial actors and the current alternative banking 
systems. Moreover, when the literature on varieties of capitalism is ex-
tended beyond its original focus on advanced countries to include devel-
oping and Latin American countries (see Schneider 2013; Etchemendy 
2011; Royo 2008), it is even more necessary to conceptualize and explain 
the different institutional configuration of markets. This article is a step 
in that direction. 




We argue that during the period of exchange rate-based stabiliza-
tion, the prereform power of domestic financial groups shaped the di-
vergent fates of domestic private banks in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. 
Once the “new” status quo was established in the liberalized markets, 
however, the transition to more stable macroeconomic schemes based 
on exchange-rate floatation played a key role. Massive twin crises (i.e., 
simultaneous currency and banking crises) were witnessed in both Ar-
gentina and Mexico, severely damaging the status quo that emerged dur-
ing neoliberalism – namely, foreign bank domination in Argentina and 
the consolidation of the traditional, prereform financial-industrial groups 
in Mexico. Thus, the liberal government of Zedillo facilitated foreign 
bank penetration in Mexico, while the populist and center-left govern-
ments of Duhalde and the Kirchners promoted the resurgence of local 
public and private banks in Argentina. In Brazil, by contrast, the 
smoother transition to a floating exchange-rate regime reinforced the 
private banking groups that had adapted during the initial stage of ne-
oliberalism. In sum, the trajectory of commercial banking liberalization 
in the three major economies of Latin America suggests that the social 
and economic power of established banks trumps broader ideological 
trends. Only when severe twin crises destroy the status quo, as happened 
in Argentina and Mexico, are governments able to push ideologically 
defined financial policies that reshape the commercial banking system.  
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Poder y crisis: Explicando las variedades de sistemas bancarios 
comerciales en Argentina, Brasil y México 
Resumen: A inicios de los años ochenta, la banca comercial en Argenti-
na, Brasil y México estaba dominada por bancos locales. Los países más 
grandes de Latinoamérica estuvieron sujetos a presiones económicas 
internacionales comunes tanto durante la etapa “neoliberal” de los 
ochenta y noventa – incluida la expansión de los mercados de capitales 
en la periferia y la integración en bloques comerciales- como en el perio-
do que le siguió al incremento en la volatilidad financiera de 1998. Hacia 
2015, en cambio, estos tres países habían consolidado modelos de siste-
mas bancarios comerciales claramente diferenciados: dominado por 
grupos privados domésticos en Brasil, mixto (i.e. mercado dividido entre 
bancos públicos, privados nacionales y extranjeros) en Argentina, y do-
minado por bancos extranjeros en México. Este artículo busca el origen 
de estos distintos desenlaces en el poder de los grupos financieros priva-
dos en el periodo ISI, la virulencia de las “crisis gemelas” (cambiarias y 
bancarias) durante la transición de un régimen de tipo de cambio fijo 
hacia uno más flexible, y el rol (contingente) de la ideología de los go-
bernantes.  
Palabras clave: América Latina, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, sistema ban-
cario, economía política 
 
